tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11297322.post113704635679419924..comments2023-05-27T10:45:58.177-05:00Comments on Philosophy of Mind Workshop: Brandom, Making It Explicit, Chapter 2, Sections V and VI, and Chapter 3 Sections I and IINat Hansenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12625816054763599267noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11297322.post-1138085466109570762006-01-24T00:51:00.000-06:002006-01-24T00:51:00.000-06:00Thanks for asking, Toby. Tell you the truth, I cou...Thanks for asking, Toby. <BR/><BR/>Tell you the truth, I could use a cup of coffee.Nat Hansenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12625816054763599267noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11297322.post-1138027893865185422006-01-23T08:51:00.000-06:002006-01-23T08:51:00.000-06:00Thanks Nat. How are you doing?"Jason said that it ...Thanks Nat. How are you doing?<BR/><BR/>"Jason said that it was hard to see how you could attribute commitments or entitlements to someone without the use of a content-involving that-clause."<BR/><BR/>Wouldn't Brandom grant that, but go on to say that any such linguistic (that-clause-involving) attribution would merely make explicit the normative doodads that are already implicitly in the act anyways?<BR/><BR/>That would fit the title of the book, at least.<BR/><BR/>Suppose we change the story of the doorman (161f), and eliminated the bit that says the community is prelinguistic(*), and just suppose that the community, though linguistic in all sorts of ways, has yet to say, write down, or otherwise linguistically (i.e., explicitly) formulate the rules governing the acquisition and use of tickets. The people in the community are engaging in a normative practice involving tickets, and are (implicitly) attributing entitlements and whatnot, but they don't go about attributing these (explicitly) via that-clauses. Thus attribution without presupposition of propositional content?<BR/><BR/>(* This modification of Brandom's story is probably missing some aspect of the original, but I have no idea what that might be.)Tobyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17890488229980159198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11297322.post-1137516144669053342006-01-17T10:42:00.000-06:002006-01-17T10:42:00.000-06:00I'd like to add that this is an impressively detai...I'd like to add that this is an impressively detailed and clearly written summary. Do you people appreciate what you have in Nat? Have you thanked Nat today? Have you even just asked him how he was doing? I suspect not. I suspect you walked by him without giving him a glance. Shame.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11297322.post-1137365491336360002006-01-15T16:51:00.000-06:002006-01-15T16:51:00.000-06:00Will,1. Unlike Brandom, Davidson regards Davidson'...Will,<BR/><BR/>1. Unlike Brandom, Davidson regards Davidson's 'argument' as an argument, not as a sketch of one whose details must be filled in if we are to have so much as an argument at all. (Davidson would, of course, allow that what he says is sketchy in various places.) I agree with Brandom to the extent that I think Davidson's stated argument is totally unconvincing. I disagree with Brandom in that I think no amount of 'filling in' will yield something better. (For what it's worth, I have an article about Davidson's argument coming out, which is on my website.)<BR/><BR/>2. Davidson rejects attempts to explain what semantic phenomena consist in. In this central respect, his philosophical orientation and methodology are radically at odds with Brandom's.<BR/><BR/>3. I think I may be missing the point of this question, but: Brandom thinks that several of Davidson's central convictions are correct, but that Davidson did not say enough to defend or explain them, and in particular that they will find their rightful place in an inferentialist account of content, something that Davidson does not offer (not even in sketch).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-11297322.post-1137055235701720602006-01-12T02:40:00.000-06:002006-01-12T02:40:00.000-06:00A question I didn't have time to raise: I'd like t...A question I didn't have time to raise: I'd like to know what other workshoppers, many of whom know more about Davidson than me, thought about Brandom's discussion of Davidson's views for today's reading (pp. 150-153). <BR/><BR/>Brandom characterizes Davidson as providing a 2-part argument for treating *linguistic* practice as central to intentionality. Davidson's argument is roughly: (1) you can't have a belief unless you know what beliefs are (and this involves contrasting between truth and error, an objective representational dimension, etc.); and (2) knowing what beliefs are (the stuff in the previous parentheses) necessarily emerges in the context of interpretation.<BR/><BR/>Brandom then notes that "what [Davidson] has really given us is not so much an argument as the form of one. Turning it into an actual argument requires filling in various notions of content, of objective representational correctness of content, of practical acknowledgement of the significance of assessments of correctness of content, and so on. That is the task of the rest of this work" (pp. 152-3).<BR/><BR/>My questions are as follows:<BR/><BR/>1. Is it true, of Davidson and/or Davidsonians, that the 2-part 'argument' is merely the *form* of an argument, that requires filling in in some way, Brandomian or otherwise?<BR/><BR/>2. What is the relationship between Davidson's project and (methodological?) commitments and Brandom's stated aims and commitments as outlined by Jason at the start of this evening's meeting? Are they compatible?<BR/><BR/>3. (Obviously related to 2.) The treatment of Davidson in this section by Brandom is one of Brandom's most sympathetic accounts of the the views of any (particularly any contemporary) philosopher. Why the trials and tribulations of Chs. 1 & 2 if the upshot is an attempt to carry out the Davidsonian project?<BR/><BR/>These questions aren't meant to constitute any type of criticism of Brandom, but to try to clarify the relationship between his views and Davidson's. Any help is greatly appreciated.<BR/><BR/>Will S.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com